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This quarter, I would like to 
share my views on the U.S. economy 
and some of the lessons learned from 
our recent business cycle. By way of 
perspective, it should be remembered 
that the U.S. economy enjoyed a re-
markable run in the 1990s. Then, it 
stumbled as we came into the new cen-
tury and struggled to find solid footing, 
going through numerous fits and starts 
early in the new millennium. Now, 
in 2005, the recession and recovery 
phases of the current cycle are behind 
us, and the economy has entered an 
expansion phase that I expect will 
carry us forward for some time. As the 
economy moves along this path of self-
sustaining growth, the Federal Reserve 
has been steadily removing the accom-
modative monetary policy that has 
been in place over the past few years, 
as it moves toward a more neutral 
policy stance. 
In reflecting on the current busi-
ness cycle and the turbulent times sur-
rounding it, I will focus on how recent 
events, as well as ongoing trends, have 
affected both the economy and the 
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conduct of monetary policy in this 
cycle. I will also address how they will 
influence the economy going forward 
and how I see the economic expansion 
progressing.
As most readers will appreciate, 
it is important that we learn from the 
experiences of the past. As the saying 
goes: “Those who cannot remember 
the past are condemned to repeat 
it.” Hopefully, some of the lessons we 
learned from our recent past will be 
incorporated into the policy decisions 
we make in the future. Nonetheless, 
before we start, I must remind you that 
every business cycle is different. Each is 
the unique product of (1) a relentlessly 
evolving economic structure, (2) some 
surprising new developments, and (3) 
a sequence of policy actions attempt-
ing to stabilize the situation. This most 
recent experience is no exception.
EXAMINING THE CONTEXT
To discuss the most recent busi-
ness-cycle experience, one must start 
at the beginning: with the revolution 
in information and communications 
technology and its dramatic effect on 
the economic structure of the U.S. 
Cheap hardware, sophisticated soft-
ware, and extensive networking capa-
bilities — both Internet and intranet 
— began transforming business pro-
cesses in earnest in the latter half of 
the 1990s. Of course, this was a world-
wide phenomenon, but it clearly had 
profound effects on the U.S. economy.
History tells us, and our most 
recent experience reconfirms, that a 
technological revolution of this mag-
nitude does not produce a smooth 
economic progression. It is, by its na-
ture, disruptive to the existing order of 
things. Nonetheless, the application of 
new information technologies brought 
real economic benefits to our economy. 
As these technologies were introduced 
into organizations and infused into 
business processes, productivity mea-
surably accelerated.
At the same time, however, it 
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were manifested in a stock market 
bubble and overinvestment in new cap-
ital. When the bubble burst and the 
investment boom deflated, aggregate 
demand decelerated rapidly, ultimately 
driving the economy into recession.
The technology revolution has 
also been an important contributor to 
globalization — a second fundamental 
factor of structural change driving the 
economy’s evolution in this business 
cycle. By slashing communications 
costs, new technologies made the 
markets for financial assets, goods and 
services, and even labor, more globally 
integrated. Globalization was driven by 
other forces as well. Freer trade among 
nations and, even more fundamentally, 
the triumph of the market system over 
centralized planning were both move-
ments that spurred integration.
Like the introduction of new tech-
nologies, the globalization of the mar-
ketplace has been and continues to be 
a good thing. It fosters greater special-
ization and gains from trade, afford-
ing everyone higher living standards. 
These benefits are genuine and worth-
while, but they do not come without 
some costs. The adjustment costs are 
significant, and in an environment of 
rapid change, they are ongoing.
I will say more about technology 
and globalization later in the article. 
But first, let me turn to the second 
ingredient of any business cycle, that 
is, the arrival of new developments and 
unexpected events.
SHOCKS TO THE ECONOMY
There were several new and sur-
prising developments during the most 
recent business cycle. We often refer 
to these events as economic shocks. In 
2000, the U.S. stock market declined 
precipitously and the tech bubble burst. 
The NASDAQ, which was valued at 
just under 5000 in March 2000, fell to 
under 2000 in April 2001. This led to 
a decrease in national wealth and had 
a negative effect on the economy as a 
whole. The Dow suffered a similar, if 
less dramatic, decline, as well.
This was followed by certainly 
the most profound event affecting the 
course of the recent business cycle: the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
It goes without saying that September 
11 stands as one of the most shocking 
and tragic episodes in our nation’s his-
tory. 
The physical effects of September 
11 were readily apparent. We saw the 
great loss of life, the horrific sights 
of the collapsing twin towers in New 
York, the damaged Pentagon in Wash-
ington, and the smoldering wreckage 
of a jet in western Pennsylvania. Yet, 
in purely economic terms, the immedi-
ate impact on the productive capacity 
of the U.S. was relatively small when 
measured against our collective re-
sources — our labor force and our cap-
ital infrastructure. Longer term, there 
have been productivity losses that are 
more difficult to quantify, namely, 
those created by enhanced security 
procedures in airports, office buildings, 
and mailrooms.
In any case, the events of Septem-
ber 11 had an immediate and profound 
contractionary effect on the demand 
side of the economy. At first, shock, 
fear, and uncertainty paralyzed every-
one. We were absorbed by what hap-
pened, and we tried to figure out what 
it meant for our country and ourselves 
personally. Meanwhile, we cancelled 
air travel and hotel reservations and 
put all but essential spending on hold. 
All things considered, consumer 
spending came back relatively quickly. 
But for businesses, it was a much 
different story. Already left with an 
overhang of equipment from the in-
vestment boom of the late 1990s, busi-
nesses confronted these new uncer-
tainties about the future and saw new 
reasons to defer and delay investment 
spending.
The events that followed in the 
aftermath of September 11 — the 
anthrax attacks and then the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq — only served 
to heighten these uncertainties. In the 
case of Iraq, the uncertainties were 
extended and indeed to some extent 
still remain. First, there was uncer-
tainty about whether war with Iraq 
would come, then about how the war 
would go, and now about whether we 
can secure the ultimate objective there 
— a politically stable and economically 
successful nation. 
Meanwhile, as the U.S. economy 
began on its path to a slow recovery, 
accounting scandals and corporate 
governance issues created new uncer-
tainties, and what some referred to as 
another “soft spot” in the economy. 
Scandals surrounding Enron and 
Worldcom, just to name two of the 
largest, undermined confidence and 
created mistrust of large corpora-
tions in the U.S. psyche. This further 
heightened investor uncertainty and 
weakened both households’ and busi-
nesses’ willingness to spend. For busi-
nesses, this rise in investor skepticism 
increased risk spreads in credit mar-
kets, raising the cost of capital faced by 
firms at least for a time.
Beyond the financial markets’ re-
action, these revelations also triggered 
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reforms legislated under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. The act was designed to 
boost investor confidence in corporate 
America by improving the quality 
of corporate disclosure and financial 
reporting and increasing the role and 
responsibility of corporate officers and 
directors. Compliance with Sarbanes-
Oxley focused companies’ attention 
and resources on their audit, account-
ing, and governance processes, and 
it remains a topic of conversation in 
the corporate suites and boardrooms 
around our nation. While this may 
have been appropriate and necessary, 
it also has diverted companies’ atten-
tion from new investment projects and 
slowed plans for future expansion. 
Completing the list of disturbanc-
es buffeting our economy is one more 
major shock that hit the economy in 
2004: a sharp increase in both the 
price and the volatility of the price 
of oil. The international benchmark 
jumped from $20 per barrel in early 
2002 to over $50 per barrel in late 
2004. It has been oscillating around 
this higher figure since late last year. 
POLICY DURING THE CYCLE
Thus far, I have talked about the 
structural changes and surprising de-
velopments affecting the shape of the 
current business cycle. But how has 
the third factor, namely, policymakers’ 
actions, affected economic dynamics 
over the past few years?
Here, I would contend that re-
markably aggressive policy action was a 
defining characteristic of this business 
cycle. Indeed, monetary and fiscal pol-
icy worked together particularly well 
this time around to provide ample and 
rapid stimulus during the economic 
downturn.
The National Bureau of Economic 
Research has determined that the U.S. 
economy fell into recession in March 
2001. On the monetary policy side, 
the Fed had begun reducing the fed 
funds rate two months earlier, in Janu-
ary 2001, and had dropped it 300 basis 
points by August. On the fiscal policy 
side, the Bush administration’s first 
round of tax cuts was enacted in the 
spring of 2001, and the first tax rebate 
checks were in the mail by July. With 
the benefit of hindsight, the timing 
of this fiscal stimulus was quite fortu-
itous.
I think a case can be made that, 
had it not been for September 11, this 
double dose of strong stimulus might 
have averted a recession by countering 
the existing weakness and giving the 
economy the push it needed to return 
to a positive growth path. I said so 
then and remain of that opinion. 
In any event, the recession oc-
curred, and the recovery was attenu-
ated in its aftermath. In response, both 
monetary and fiscal policymakers 
reacted by providing yet additional 
rounds of stimulus. These policy ac-
tions may not have succeeded in 
turning business investment spending 
around very quickly, but they certainly 
helped buoy consumer spending. This 
kept the economy growing while busi-
nesses positioned themselves to re-en-
gage.
In 2004, the U.S. economy had 
a fairly good year. Output growth of 
nearly 4 percent and the creation of 
over 2 million net new jobs lend cre-
dence to the argument that the econo-
my has regained its balance and is now 
on a path of sustained expansion. And 
this occurred without a noticeable ac-
celeration in core inflation.
Looking forward, the economy 
appears to be on course for a sustained 
period of solid expansion. I expect 
real GDP to grow at an annual rate of 
around 4 percent this year and next, 
with payroll employment increasing by 
150,000 to 200,000 jobs per month.
On the demand side, consumers 
will continue to spend at a good pace. 
As I stated earlier, during this most 
recent recession and recovery, con-
sumer spending held up unusually well, 
continuously expanding throughout 
the cycle. Looking forward, steady job 
growth and rising household incomes 
will fuel continued growth in con-
sumer spending, replacing the stimula-
tive effects of low interest rates and tax 
rate reductions, which were key to the 
earlier period of continued consump-
tion growth.
Going forward, the expansion 
will be driven by business spending. 
Firms have ample cash flow and have 
had significant profit growth. They are 
now well positioned for greater effi-
ciency and will see the need for greater 
productive capacity as the expansion 
continues. For all these reasons, I 
anticipate that the robust growth in 
business investment spending we have 
been experiencing will continue for 
the foreseeable future. Add to this pat-
tern of private-sector spending moder-
ate growth in government spending on 
goods and services, and you have solid 
growth in domestic final sales.
One potential constraint on 
demand growth that has re-emerged 
recently is rising oil prices.  As I men-
tioned, we saw oil prices reach over 
$50 a barrel in late 2004. Subsequently, 
they fell back a bit, but now the U.S. 
economy is faced with oil prices in 
excess of $50 a barrel once again. With 
gasoline prices rising to substantially 
over $2 a gallon, consumers may find 
that growth in their discretionary 
spending must slow in order to ac-
commodate the increased cost of fill-
ing their gas tanks.  Similarly, rising 
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energy costs could curtail businesses’ 
capacity to increase their investment 
spending. The bottom line is that oil 
prices persistently in the $50-per-bar-
rel-plus range could slow the pace of 
domestic demand growth this year, 
though they should not jeopardize the 
expansion itself.  
Of course, as we have all become 
aware, just how much of that domestic 
demand translates into domestic pro-
duction depends on what happens to 
our international trade balance. Over 
the past decade, a strong dollar and a 
relatively strong U.S. economy drove 
the current account to unprecedented 
heights. It now represents a sizable 
percentage of U.S. GDP. In fact, in 
2004, the widening trade gap or cur-
rent account deficit — take your pick 
— drained more than 1.5 percent from 
domestic output growth.
Over the past year or so, at least 
partially in response to the large trade 
deficits, the dollar has steadily depreci-
ated. A lower dollar should eventually 
help stabilize our net export position. 
Though economic growth has been 
somewhat uneven among our trading 
partners of late, continued global eco-
nomic expansion should help as well. 
As the trade deficit begins to stabilize, 
solid growth in spending by U.S. con-
sumers and businesses will translate 
directly into solid growth in real GDP 
for the U.S.
Having emphasized the output 
growth in the current expansion, I 
want to turn to another development 
that has received considerable atten-
tion over this entire cycle and, more 
recently, as the economy has moved 
from recovery to expansion. This is the 
issue of the dynamics of inflation and 
the potential for price pressures devel-
oping as the economy moves along its 
path of continued growth.
As an economist, I recognize that 
price pressures are an inevitable part 
of any business expansion. I think we 
all recognize that as the economy con-
tinues on its path of expansion, price 
dynamics are prone to shift. As pro-
ductivity growth returns to trend, unit 
labor costs will probably start to rise, 
potentially putting pressure on prices. 
We already saw some indications of a 
shift down toward long-run productiv-
ity growth at the end of last year. In 
addition, higher prices for oil and other 
commodities may lead producers to try 
to pass on some of their higher input 
costs, potentially igniting or exacerbat-
ing latent price pressures. Moreover, 
the recent decline in the value of the 
dollar may lessen the competitive pres-
sure on domestic producers that has 
until now limited their pricing power. 
Recently, I have been hearing from my 
contacts around the District that price 
pressures are building and there has 
been some evidence of firms passing 
on higher costs in final product prices.
It is incumbent upon the Fed to 
make every effort to keep price pres-
sures well contained. As long as the 
public remains confident in the Fed’s 
commitment to essential price stability 
— and the Fed conducts its policy in 
a manner consistent with that com-
mitment — transitory adjustments in 
prices will not generate persistently 
higher inflation.
The Federal Reserve has already 
begun the transition from an accom-
modative policy stance to a neutral 
one, more consistent with sustained 
noninflationary economic growth.  If 
the economy evolves as I have sug-
gested here, then I expect we will con-
tinue on our present course of moving 
the federal funds rate toward neutral-
ity.  However, the precise course we 
take depends on the precise course the 
economy takes.  If signs of heightened 
price pressure emerge on a consistent 
basis, we will need to consider quick-
ening the pace at which we move to-
ward policy neutrality.
LESSONS LEARNED
To summarize, the U.S. economy 
experienced a period of extraordi-
nary growth over the decade of the 
1990s, followed by a sharp slowdown 
in spending on new information and 
computer technology. Then it was 
pushed into recession and a tenuous 
recovery by the September 11 attacks 
and their aftermath, as well as a series 
of corporate scandals and other events. 
Now with these events behind us, I 
believe the economy is on a course for 
steady growth at a sustainable pace. 
This pattern of growth should foster 
continued job growth and a relatively 
stable price environment. All in all, 
economic prospects are reasonably 
good in the U.S.
Having said that, now is prob-
ably a good time to look back at the 
past four years and try to extract some 
lessons that policymakers can carry 
forward to the next business cycle, 
whenever it may come. In that spirit, I 
will outline five distinct lessons that I 
garnered from the experiences of the 
recent past.
LESSON 1: TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION CAN DRIVE A 
CYCLE 
The first lesson that I take away 
from an examination of our most 
recent economic episode is that new 
technologies and investment in new 
technologies can be powerful drivers 
of business cycle dynamics. The most 
recent business cycle, from the historic 
10-year expansion to the recession of 
2001 and the subsequent recovery, was 
It is incumbent upon 
the Fed to make 
every effort to keep 
price pressures well 
contained.  Business Review  Q2  2005   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
an investment-driven one. Growth in 
investment spending strengthened and 
sustained the expansion of the 1990s. 
Then the collapse in business invest-
ment spending generated the recession 
and attenuated the recovery. Finally, 
the return of business investment 
spending ushered in the broader eco-
nomic recovery beginning in 2003.
At the same time, the increased 
productivity experienced in the late 
1990s, owing to the large investment 
in information and communication 
technology (ICT), allowed the U.S. 
economy to produce high levels of out-
put while not experiencing inflationary 
pressures.
The dynamic at work was that 
the new, profitable investments being 
offered in ICT created an increase in 
productivity, which translated into in-
creased profits, and thus more invest-
ing and consuming. At the same time, 
the increase in productivity growth 
helped keep down unit labor costs and 
prices. This led to a period of strong 
growth and low inflation.
In retrospect, business technology 
spending in the late 1990s represented 
a mix of both good and bad business 
judgments. Some of the ICT spend-
ing turned out to be wise and even 
prescient investment in productive new 
capital. Some of it was just investment 
pulled forward for fear that legacy 
equipment would malfunction in Y2K. 
And some of it — often associated 
with ill-conceived “dot-com” business 
plans — reflected “irrational exuber-
ance” about the viability of new busi-
ness models.
However, much of this overinvest-
ment can be explained by rational 
behavior. It may be that in the 1990s, 
firms were rationally forecasting huge 
gains in productivity due to the ICT 
revolution. Firms were very optimistic 
about the future, so they built up large 
amounts of capital. This led to increas-
es in output, employment, and invest-
ment. However, when these expecta-
tions were not fully met, and it became 
evident there was an over-buildup in 
capital, firms stopped investing.
In any case, it took the business 
sector three years, from 2000 through 
2002, to digest those investments. 
From an accounting perspective, it 
took three years to depreciate accumu-
lated stock of hardware and software. 
From an economic perspective, it took 
three years to put existing capital to its 
most productive use by reallocating it 
across firms and fully exploiting its ca-
pabilities to boost productivity and cut 
costs within firms.
The time it took for firms to 
begin investing again may have been 
amplified by the large negative shocks 
I spoke of earlier, and businesses 
may have been reluctant to increase 
investment in this environment of 
uncertainty. But whatever the cause, 
variation in business spending caused 
variation in economic activity.
Now, the forces are aligned for 
strong growth in business investment 
spending. Firms have had time to fully 
digest their previous acquisitions of 
capital. Profits have been strong. The 
economic outlook is positive, and some 
of the previous risks and uncertainties 
are dissipating. Indeed, firms are again 
investing in everything from high-tech 
equipment and software to warehouses 
and equipment, positioning themselves 
for greater efficiency and greater pro-
ductive capacity going forward. The 
U.S. economy is again on a path of 
sustained expansion.
LESSON 2: GLOBALIZATION IS 
AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN 
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND 
INFLATION 
A second lesson this most recent 
business cycle brought into focus is 
that global dynamics play an impor-
tant role in the path our domestic 
economy will follow. There has been 
considerable discussion concerning the 
increased role of globalization and its 
effect on developed economies. This 
cycle has spotlighted three distinct but 
interrelated effects the global economy 
has had on our domestic economy.
The first is the traditional one 
that focuses on the competitive pres-
sures that globalization has brought 
to the market for goods and services. 
Here, the impact of the current ac-
count on domestic production has 
been an essential ingredient of the 
dynamics of the U.S. economy. 
In this cycle, the debate expanded 
to a second area, the labor market, to 
include the “outsourcing” or “off-shor-
ing” of labor services, a trend tied to 
the technology revolution. Improve-
ments in information and communica-
tions technology are creating a globally 
integrated marketplace — not only for 
goods and services but also for labor. 
Of course, such “off-shoring” has been 
the trend in much of the production 
activity associated with manufacturing 
for a long time. But it seemed to inten-
sify in this cycle, particularly with the 
opening of several newly developing 
economies. It also seems to be spread-
ing to the service sector.
Firms are again investing in everything 
from high-tech equipment and software to 
warehouses and equipment, positioning 
themselves for greater efﬁciency and greater 
productive capacity.Increasingly, then, U.S. firms com-
pete with firms around the world in 
the markets for raw materials and final 
goods and services, while U.S. work-
ers compete with workers around the 
world for positions in a widening array 
of occupations and industries. From 
the macroeconomic perspective, this 
globalization of the marketplace and 
the increased degree of competition it 
brings are powerful forces that can al-
ter the wage and price dynamics of the 
U.S. economy and, indeed, have done 
so over this cycle, persistently dampen-
ing upward price pressures. 
The third important aspect of 
globalization from a U.S. policymaker’s 
perspective is the globalization of capi-
tal markets. Indeed, globalization of 
capital markets has substantively af-
fected both the dynamics of trade and 
domestic production in this cycle. 
Investors, believing the return on 
capital in the United States to be rela-
tively attractive on a risk-adjusted ba-
sis, funneled a large fraction of global 
wealth into the U.S. capital market. 
Global investors purchased large quan-
tities of dollar-denominated assets, 
keeping the dollar’s exchange value 
high through the tech boom — even 
while the economy went into recession 
and the current account turned decid-
edly negative.
The trade-weighted exchange val-
ue of the dollar appreciated 35 percent 
from 1995 to 2001 and stayed strong 
through 2002. This had a two-prong 
effect on the U.S. economy. First, it 
drove up our trade deficit to record 
levels. Second, it kept a relatively tight 
lid on inflation by putting low-priced 
goods on the market in the U.S.
Now, it seems that investors are 
becoming less willing to channel so 
much of their savings into additional 
dollar-denominated instruments. Some 
have suggested that they are beginning 
to diversify into other currencies, such 
as the euro. This has caused the dollar 
to depreciate against other currencies. 
In fact, over the past year, the trade-
weighted value of the dollar has fallen 
about 10 percent.
Gradually, the depreciation of the 
dollar will translate into lower prices 
for exports from the U.S. and higher 
prices for imports into the U.S. Thus, 
the pattern of output and prices in the 
U.S. in this cycle has been, and will 
continue to be, affected by the global 
economy. 
LESSON 3: COUNTERCYCLICAL 
POLICY CAN BE AN EFFECTIVE 
DEMAND FORCE 
The shape of this business cycle 
was substantively affected by counter-
cyclical government policies. Aggres-
sive use of both monetary and fiscal 
policy clearly reduced the severity 
of the recession and accelerated the 
course of the recovery. 
On the monetary policy side, the 
Federal Reserve reduced its target 
federal funds rate by 475 basis points 
— from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent 
— in the recession year of 2001. When 
the recovery threatened to stall, the 
Fed once again reacted, dropping the 
target fed funds rate to just 1 percent, 
its lowest level since the 1950s. 
The countercyclical monetary pol-
icy the Fed implemented gave consum-
ers the opportunity to borrow at rela-
tively low interest rates, and they cer-
tainly seized it. Households increased 
their purchases of homes and durables 
at record rates, dampening the breadth 
and depth of the past recession. They 
also sustained that growth, which 
gave business investment both time 
to recover and a reason to invest into 
a better future. The precise channels 
through which monetary policy oper-
ates may vary from cycle to cycle, but 
its use in this cycle clearly showed its 
effectiveness. 
Fiscal policy also played a key role 
in the dynamics of this cycle. Well-
timed tax cuts and tax rebates helped 
sustain consumer spending during the 
recession and the early stages of the 
recovery. However, the application of 
fiscal stimulus is notoriously hard to 
time properly. The tax cuts enacted 
in this cycle had been proposed not as 
countercyclical measures but as part of 
a long-term shift in tax policy. Their 
timing was fortuitous.
Moreover, as we are now seeing, it 
is extremely difficult to remove fiscal 
stimulus once the economy is on the 
road to recovery. Indeed, it remains to 
be seen whether expansive fiscal poli-
cies can be reversed and the federal 
budget can be returned to balance as 
we move through the expansion phase 
of the cycle. As an economist, I see 
the value of fiscal integrity, and this 
requires a cyclically balanced federal 
budget.  
 
LESSON 4: MONETARY POLICY 
WORKS BEST IN A STABLE 
PRICE ENVIRONMENT 
The next lesson I would like to 
offer is that we have learned that mon-
etary policy works best in a stable price 
environment. In such an environment, 
the central bank can reduce interest 
rates without the fear of increasing 
inflation expectations. Consumers 
and businesses perceive the reduction 
The countercyclical monetary policy the Fed 
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in real interest rates as temporary and 
so see it as an opportune time to shift 
spending forward. By doing so, they 
dampen the recession. Then, as the re-
covery proceeds, the private sector can 
anticipate the actions of the central 
bank and its plan to return short-term 
rates to more normal levels.
This played out quite well in 
the recent cycle. The core PCE was 
within a 1.5 percent to 2 percent band 
heading into the recession and has 
remained in that range during the 
recovery. This was true even while the 
Federal Reserve reduced the fed funds 
target rate in the aggressive manner I 
have laid out. Not only did the Federal 
Reserve reduce rates to these histori-
cally low levels, but it sent the message 
that it would keep these rates low for 
the foreseeable future. In fact, we did, 
keeping the target fed funds at 1 per-
cent for an entire year.  
 
LESSON 5: EXPECTATIONS 
MATTER 
This discussion brings me to my 
last lesson, something I have been say-
ing for some time. Expectations matter, 
and they play an important role in the 
conduct of national monetary policy. 
Let me explain why. 
The goal of the Federal Reserve 
is to create financial conditions that 
foster maximum sustainable economic 
growth. To achieve this, the Fed must 
make two important contributions to 
the economy. First, it is charged with 
providing essential price stability, 
meaning little or no inflation. Second, 
it attempts to offset shifts in demand 
that deter the economy’s ability to 
reach its potential. These goals are 
compatible, but each receives different 
emphasis as the situation warrants.
As a central banker, I recognize 
that long-run price stability is always 
of utmost importance. This means not 
only a stable price level in the near 
term but also the expectation of stable 
prices over the long term. This implies 
that optimal monetary policy is not 
simply a matter of establishing a stable 
price level today but of ensuring stable 
prices — and expectations of price sta-
bility — into the future. Only then can 
consumers and investors be confident 
in the environment in which they must 
make decisions that have implications 
far into the future. For this reason, 
central bankers often talk about the 
need to establish credibility and the 
public’s confidence in our long-run 
commitment to price stability.
The Fed can maintain the credi-
bility of its commitment to price stabil-
ity and avoid sharp changes in public 
expectations about monetary policy by 
being as transparent as possible about 
its own decision-making. As a result, 
information about the Fed’s policy 
goals, its assessment of the current 
economic situation, and its strategic 
direction are increasingly a part of 
the public record. For some time, the 
Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) has released statements after 
every FOMC meeting. Very recently, 
the FOMC  began releasing the min-
utes of each meeting prior to the next 
meeting. They not only report our 
decisions concerning immediate action 
but also our sense of the key factors 
driving near-term economic develop-
ments and the strategic tilt to our ac-
tions going forward.
Increasing the degree of central 
bank transparency is one reason I and 
some of my colleagues have spoken in 
favor of an explicit inflation-targeting 
program. I believe we have reached a 
point where institutionalizing infla-
tion targeting simply makes good sense 
from an economic perspective. In 
short, it is a reasonable next step in the 
evolution of U.S. monetary policy, and 
it would help secure full and lasting 
benefits from our current stable price 
environment. 
Evolving to explicit inflation tar-
geting from our current implicit target 
has significant potential benefits, and 
the costs may be minimal if we can 
implement it in a constructive man-
ner. Clearly, proper implementation 
of inflation targeting is crucial to its 
success. That, in turn, requires more 
research and analysis about how and 
when to introduce it. But while it re-
quires more public debate and discus-
sion, it may be an idea whose time is 
approaching.
CONCLUSION
I hope I have convinced you that 
there are useful lessons to be learned 
from the dynamics of the recent busi-
ness cycle in the U.S. While every 
cycle is unique, each also highlights 
some enduring realities that bear re-
membering. Indeed, it is careful atten-
tion to both aspects of our experience 
that moves forward both the science 
of economics and the art of economic 
policymaking. If we keep learning, 
perhaps both the practice of macroeco-
nomic policy and the theory of central 
banking taught at great universities 
will advance.
I recognize that no matter how 
much we learn, the central bank’s 
power will always be limited.  I do not 
think we will ever reach a point where 
we will eliminate the business cycle! 
But we may be able to move closer to 
conducting optimal monetary policy in 
a world where change is relentless and 
surprising new developments continue 
to unfold. B R